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1. Introduction
Lucid dreaming is characterised by the awareness that one 
is dreaming, and may be followed by the capacity to con-
sciously influence the content of the dream (LaBerge, 1980). 
Thus, the lucid dreamer may be able to make conscious de-
cisions and even change the dream narrative (Tholey, 1989). 
In a student population, the percentage of people who have 
experienced this phenomenon at least once in their lifetime 
is as high as 82% (Schredl & Erlacher, 2004), while peo-
ple who are considered spontaneous lucid dreamers var-
ies between 19% (Erlacher, Schredl, Watanabe, Yamana, 
& Gantzert, 2008) and 37% (Schredl & Erlacher, 2004). A 
recent meta-analysis found that for the general population, 
the percentage is 23% (Saunders, Roe, Smith & Gregg, 
2016). Studies successfully verified the existence of lucid 
dreams in laboratories in the late 1970s (LaBerge, 1990). 
Recent fMRI data have associated lucid dreaming with a 
reactivation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), 
which is usually deactivated during REM sleep, thus poten-
tially explaining the return of the reflective cognitive abilities 
(Johnson, 2002; Dresler, Wehrle, Spoormaker, Koch, Hols-
boer, Steiger, Obrig, Samann & Czisch, 2012; Stumbrys, 
Erlacher & Schredl, 2013), although such a conclusion is 
preliminary as the studies rely on small sample sizes. 
The ability to experience lucid dreams is related to par-
ticular cognitive strengths from waking life, as well as to 
certain personality traits, and other factors. For instance, 
dream recall frequency has been found to correlate with 
lucid dream frequency (Blackmore, 1982; Watson, 2003; 
Schredl & Erlacher, 2004; Schredl & Erlacher, 2011). In terms 
of personality traits, small significant correlations between 
openness to experience and lucid dream frequency have 
been found by several studies ( Schredl & Erlacher, 2004; 
Schredl, Henley-Einion & Blagrove, 2016; Hess, Schredl & 
Goritz, 2016). Similarly, studies have been conducted found 
that lucid dreamers have an internal locus of control, scored 
on Levenson’s (1973) internal locus of control as well as on 
Rotter’s (1966) locus of control (Blagrove & Hartnell, 2000; 
Blagrove & Tucker, 1994). Additionally, frequent gamers ex-
perience a higher frequency of lucid dreams than individuals 
who do not play games at all (Gackenbach, 2006, 2009). 
The further development in our understanding of lucid 
dreaming requires that new factors are analysed against 
lucid dreaming frequency. In the search for factors that pre-
dict this capacity to distinguish dream from waking reality, 
little to no attention has yet been paid to reflective reason-
ing abilities in the context of the dual-processing theory of 
reasoning (see Evans, 2010, for an overview of the theory). 
Since ancient times, many authors from various fields have 
attested the existence of two types of cognition, implicit 
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and explicit (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). The two processing 
mechanisms have many different properties, with the first 
type characterised as fast, non-logical, automatic, uncon-
scious and high capacity while the second type is slow, logi-
cal, controlled, conscious and low capacity (Evans, 2003). 
The type 2 processing mechanism is believed to be uniquely 
human as it allows sophisticated reasoning capacities dif-
ferent from those seen in animals (Stanovich, 1999). Fur-
thermore, it is thought to require decontextualized process-
ing which tends to reject knowledge or belief-based biases. 
When confronted with a problem, some people may come 
up with quick and plausible judgement, while others may 
discard the immediate response and engage in further re-
flection (Frederick, 2005). One proposed explanation sug-
gests that people tend to neglect information in their think-
ing, mostly because the type 1 processing mechanism is 
used by default due to its low computational expense (Ev-
ans, 2008). This strong bias to default to the least expen-
sive computational mechanism results in humans being less 
than rational (Toplak, West & Stanovich, 2014). Individuals 
who rely on their type 1 processing mechanism and neglect 
relevant information are considered cognitive misers (Bau-
meister and Bushman, 2008). 
The fMRI studies available provide support for the qualita-
tive distinction between belief- and reason-based response, 
with activation in different regions of the brain for the two 
instances (De Neys, Vartanian, & Goel, 2008; Goel & Dolan, 
2003; Tsujii & Watanabee, 2009). In addition, Greene, Nys-
trom, Engell, Darley and Cohen (2004) found neuroimag-
ing evidence of type 2 processing system overwriting the 
type 1 processing system that was coming from the emo-
tion centres, thus concluding that the main area responsible 
for overwriting an emotional response is the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex. The sudden insight that one experienc-
es at the beginning of a lucid dream could be attributed to 
the activation of the rational type 2 processing system that 
overwrites the dominant emotional type 1 system.
The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which is normally de-
activated during REM sleep (Miller & Cummings, 1999), 
shows activation during lucid dreaming (Voss et al., 2009). 
The same area is thought to be involved mainly in linking 
the information stored in our short-term memory to the 
organisation of forthcoming actions (Fuster, 1997). Thus, 
this particular area of the brain that activates during lucid 
dreams loads heavily on working memory while supporting 
theoretical thinking which is necessary for the planning of 
future events. These attributes have been found as defining 
features of the type 2 processing system (Evans & Stanov-
ich, 2013). Moreover, the evolution of this rational second 
system can be seen as a precursor and requirement for the 
manifestation of lucid dreams because they require con-
scious rationality. There seem to be a connection between 
the workings of the second system and lucid dreaming me-
diated by the activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. 
Thus, it is worth investigating the dual-processing theory of 
reasoning as a possible explanation for the emergence of 
lucid dreams. 
The prime measure for rational reflection that is a prop-
erty of type 2 processing system is the Cognitive Reflection 
Test (Frederick, 2005) which was constructed to measure an 
individual’s ability to override an intuitive, spontaneous re-
sponse to a problem and engage in further reflection which 
might lead to the correct answer (Frederick, 2005). The Cog-
nitive Reflection Test (CRT) differs from well-known insight 
problems where individuals have to spend a lot of time and 
cognitive resources and still fail to answer because no viable 
solution comes to mind. The questions used in the CRT trig-
ger an attractive alternative response, thus it is a measure 
of rational thought, rather than a measure of an underlying 
ability that supports rational thought (Toplak, West & Sta-
novich, 2014). In a dream state, individuals who overwrite 
their first instinctive assumption about reality become aware 
of the fact that they are dreaming thus enabling control over 
the dream through rationality. Although rationality seems to 
occur even in non-lucid dreams, the “rational thought” bar 
is set higher in lucid dreams where individuals see through 
the illusion of the dream and further thought operates from 
this premise (Hurd & Belkeley, 2014).
Another measure for the type 2 processing system can 
be derived from syllogistic reasoning tasks (Evans, 2008). 
Syllogisms are arguments that apply deductive reasoning, 
which is a property of type 2 processing system, to reach 
a conclusion based on two propositions that are assumed 
to be true. Furthermore, deductive reasoning can be seen 
as a fundamental cognitive skill as well as one of the cor-
nerstones of logical thought. Generally, individuals use this 
type of reasoning in their daily lives in order to reach a con-
clusion from a set of information. An essential component 
of good deductive reasoning skills is the ability to reason 
only with relevant information and ignore beliefs. Instead, 
there is a tendency of individuals to allow for prior beliefs 
and knowledge to cloud their judgement and reach a wrong 
conclusion. This common fallacy is called a belief bias and it 
is more likely for people to judge a conclusion as valid when 
it is believable (Evans, Barston & Pollard, 1983; Thompson, 
1996; Evans & Over, 2004). 
It can be hypothesised, then, that individuals who activate 
the type 2 processing system during REM sleep might show 
cognitive strengths while awake, particularly those related 
to rationality by overcoming belief bias and rational reflec-
tion which are properties of the type 2 processing system. 
A lateral/dorsolateral prefrontal cortex modulation caused 
by syllogism content was noticed in a study conducted by 
Brunetti et al (2014) when looking at the influence of emo-
tions on reasoning abilities. This is the area that is deacti-
vated during REM sleep, but active during lucid dreaming; 
thus providing more evidence of the connection between 
dual-processing theory and lucid dreaming, more precisely 
the activation of type 2 processing system that corresponds 
to the sudden realisation that one is dreaming. As far as 
causality is concerned, it makes sense to assume that the 
activation of type 2 processing system coincides with the 
onset of a lucid dream.
The aim of this study, then, was to test the dual-process-
ing hypothesis of lucid dreaming, as well as attempt to 
replicate previous lucid dreaming correlate findings, for the 
purpose of furthering our understanding of the mechanisms 
involved in lucid dreaming as well as understand why some 
people experience this phenomenon more than others. By 
linking the existing body of knowledge on lucid dreaming 
with two measures of dual-processing theory, the cognitive 
reflective test and a syllogistic reasoning task, we expect 
to gain new insights into the workings of the human mind, 
i.e. how waking life rational and reflective rationalities are 
related to the rationality experienced during REM sleep by 
lucid dreamers.
A secondary purpose of the study was to investigate 
whether prospective and retrospective measures of lucid 
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dreaming frequency are correlated. Response biases and 
memory failures may emerge when retrospective measures 
of dream frequency are used (Beaulieu-Prevost & Zadra, 
2005). One study comparing nightmare and bad dream 
frequency data acquired using prospective and retrospec-
tive estimates found that retrospective measures underesti-
mate nightmare and bad dream frequency (Robert & Zadra, 
2008). As such, we conducted two studies, one in which 
retrospective estimates were taken, and a second in which 
both retrospective and prospective measures were taken for 
comparison.
For study 1, it was hypothesised that there would be a 
positive correlation between retrospective measures of lu-
cid dream frequency and internal locus of control, dream 
recall frequency, openness to experience, video game play, 
and Cognitive Reflection Test scores. For study 2, it was 
also hypothesised that high frequency lucid dreamers (mea-
sured both retrospectively and prospectively) would score 
higher on the CRT, syllogisms test, internal locus of control, 
dream recall frequency, and openness to experience. Final-
ly, it was hypothesised that there would be a positive cor-
relation between retrospective and prospective measures of 
lucid dream frequency.
2. Study 1 Method
2.1. Participants
One hundred and three participants (52 males and 51 
females), with ages ranging from 16 to 65 (M = 24.39, 
SD = 6.97), were recruited using convenience sampling via 
posters and fliers from the University of Bedfordshire. Psy-
chology students were asked not to participate because 
they were familiar with the Cognitive ReflectionsTest and 
this would have compromised the results. 
2.2. Materials 
The questionnaire, which was hosted online on Qualtrics, 
consisted of the following:
Levenson’s (1973) internal Locus of Control scale, mea-
suring the extent to which individuals believe that they con-
trol events affecting them, which included 7 items (α=.51) 
responded to on a 6-point Likert scale (-3 = strongly dis-
agree to +3 = strongly agree), e.g. “I am usually able to pro-
tect my personal interests.”. 
Schredl and Erlacher’s (2004) Lucid Dreaming Frequency 
scale which contains 2 items measured on an eight-point 
rating scale (0 = never, 7 = several times a week), e.g. “How 
often do you experience so-called lucid dreams?” and 
“How often do you remember your dreams?”. In order to 
eliminate confusion regarding Lucid Dream Frequency, a 
definition was formulated and given to the participants: “Lu-
cid dreams are dreams in which the dreaming individual be-
comes aware of being in a dream and intentionally changes 
certain elements”. A re-test reliability r = .89 (p < .001) for 
the lucid dream frequency scale supports its consistency 
(Schredl & Erlacher, 2004). 
Schredl and Erlacher’s (2004) Dream Recall Frequency 
scale measured by a 7-point rating scale (0 – never; 1 - less 
than once a month; 2 - about once a month; 3 – twice or 
three times a month; 4 - about once a week; 5 – several 
times a week; 6 – almost every morning).
A Video Game Play measure consisting of 2 items mea-
suring the frequency of gaming activities as well as the fre-
quency of immersive gaming activities on an 8-point rating 
scale ( 0 – never, 1 – less than once a year, 2- less than once 
a month, 3- once a month, 5 – 2-3 times a month, 5- once 
a week, 6 – 2-3 times a week, 7 – daily); e.g. “How often do 
you play video games?” and “How often do you play im-
mersive video games?”; also, immersive video games were 
defined to the participants in order to eliminate confusion: 
“An artificial, interactive, computer created scene or ‘world’ 
within which a user feels involved.” A single score for game 
playing was calculated from the mean of the two items. 
John and Srivastava’s (1999) Openness to Experience 
measure from the Big Five Factors of Personality (Goldberg, 
1993) which measures an individual’s active imagination, 
preference for variety, intellectual curiosity, aesthetic sensi-
tivity and attentiveness to inner feelings; it contains 8 items 
(α=0.45) measured on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly 
disagree to 5 = strongly agree), e.g. “I see myself as some-
one who is inventive” 
An expanded version of the Cognitive Reflection Test de-
veloped by Toplak, West and Stanovich (2014) which mea-
sures the reflective reasoning abilities and contains 7 ques-
tions (α=0.72) designed to measure one’s ability to overwrite 
an initial instinctive answer using rational thought, e.g.: “A 
bat and a ball cost 1.10$ in total. The bat costs 1.00$ more 
than the ball. How much does the ball cost?”. Participants 
received a score out of seven, with each point denoting a 
correct answer.
2.3. Procedure
The study received ethical approval from the University of 
Bedfordshire prior to the collection of data. Participants 
were recruited from the University of Bedfordshire via post-
ers and fliers. The study was internet-based and required 
that participants give their consent in order to start the 
questionnaire. Participants were informed about the nature 
of the study prior to the completion of the questionnaire 
and were also asked not to consult any outside source of 
information while completing the questionnaire. The study 
was conducted on Qualtrics. The study consisted of three 
questionnaires (Dream Lucidity Questionnaire, Video Game 
Play Frequency and Lucid Dreaming Frequency/Dream 
Recall Frequency Questionnaire), two scales (Internal Lo-
cus of Control Scale and Openness to Experience Scale) 
and an extended version of the Cognitive Reflection Test 
taken from Toplak, West and Stanovich (2014); completed 
by every participant in this order. Every questionnaire was 
on a different page. After the completion of the question-
naires, participants were directed to a page where they were 
thanked for their time, debriefed, and given an email ad-
dress in case they wanted to leave any comments regarding 
the study.
3. Study 1 Results and Discussion
Correlations were conducted between retrospective Lucid 
Dream Frequency and dream recall frequency, openness 
to experience, locus of control, video game play, and CRT 
scores. Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for these 
variables.
Of the 103 participants, 12 reported no lucid dreams 
(marked 0=never on Schredl and Erlacher’s (2004) Lucid 
Dreaming Frequency and Dream Recall Frequency scale), 
71 reported occasional lucid dreams (marked 1=less than 
once a year, 2=about once a year, 3=about two or four times 
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a year) and 20 reported having frequent lucid dreams, fre-
quency equal to or higher than once per month (marked 
4=about once a month, 5=about two to four times a month, 
6=about once a week, 7=several times a week). Percent-
ages are displayed in Table 2.
Alpha level was reduced to .01 to account for the inflated 
Type 1 error when conducting multiple correlations. There 
was a significant positive correlation found between Inter-
nal Locus of Control and LDF r = .23, p = .01, 1-tailed, and 
between Dream Recall and Lucid Dream Frequency r = .33, 
p < .001, 1-tailed. The correlation between Openness to Ex-
perience scores and LDF; approached significance r = .18, 
p = .03, 1-tailed. No significant correlations were found be-
tween Video Game Play and LDF or CRT scores and LDF 
(see Table 3).
Thus the first study supported previous research in finding 
a relationship between lucid dream frequency and dream 
recall frequency, and lucid dream frequency and internal lo-
cus of control. However, it did not support previous findings 
pertaining to openness to experience, nor video game play. 
Further, it did not find evidence for a relationship between 
lucid dream frequency and scores on the Cognitive Reflec-
tions Test, thereby not supporting a dual process hypoth-
esis of lucid dreaming. 
A methodological issue with utilising retrospective esti-
mates of lucid dream frequency is that memory biases and 
expectations may influence these estimates, and result in 
inaccuracies. Because of this possibility, Study 2 was con-
ducted, using both retrospective estimates and prospective 
recordings, as follows.
4. Study 2 Method
4.1. Participants
Thirty participants (15 male and 15 female), with ages rang-
ing from 20 to 51 (M = 25.47, SD = 6.59), were recruited 
using convenience sampling via posters and fliers from the 
University of Bedfordshire (N=9), as well as from dreaming 
related Facebook forums and communities (N=21). Indi-
viduals who participated in the first study and were familiar 
with the Cognitive Reflective Test were not eligible to take 
part in the study.
4.2. Materials
The questionnaire included Levenson‘s (1973) Internal Lo-
cus of Control scale, two open-ended questions regarding 
dream recall and frequency of lucid dreams e.g. “How many 
dreams do you remember on average per week?” and “In a 
typical month, how many lucid dreams do you have?”, John 
and Srivastava’s (1999) Openness to Experience measure 
from the Big Five Factors of Personality (Goldberg, 1993), 
and the expanded version of the Cognitive Reflection Test 
developed by Toplak, West and Stanovich (2014), as de-
tailed the method for Study 1. In addition, a syllogisms test 
was included, containing 4 categorical syllogisms e.g. “No 
books are novels. Some magazines are novels. Therefore, 
some books are not magazines” and 4 conditional syllo-
gisms e.g. “If a person is a guitarist, then he is a professor. If 
a person is a professor, then he is a musician”. 
The dream diary consisted of 30 tables (one per day for 
the duration of the study), each table containing five boxes 
that participants could tick if they had had one of the follow-
ing dreams: a lucid dream, a dream with a logical pattern, a 
dream with negative content, a dream with positive content, 
Table 2. Percentages of lucid dreamers
Variable Number of 
participants
Percent-
age 
Non-lucid dreamers 12 11.65%
Occasional lucid dreamers 71 68.93%
Frequent lucid dreamers 20 19.42%
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for Study 1 variables
Variable Mean (SD)
Lucid Dream Frequency 3.89 (1.83)
Openness to Experience 3.67 (0.47)
Locus of Control 4.43 (0.60)
Video Game Play 4.04 (2.18)
CRT scores 3.58 (1.83)
Dream Recall Frequency 5.65 (1.63)
Table 3. Correlation Coefficient
Dream Recall CRT scores Openness to
Experience
Locus of
Control
Game Play
frequency
LDF .34* -.02 .18 .23* .14
Dream Recall --- .05 .12 .001 -.13
CRT scores --- .11 .21* .29*
Openness to Experience --- .29* .20*
Locus of Control --- .12
Game Play Frequency ---
* Correlation is significant at the p < .01 level.
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and/or a recurrent dream). Explanations of lucid dream, 
logical pattern and recurring dream were provided on the 
first page of the dream diary. Analyses were not conducted 
on the frequency of logical, negative, positive, or recurrent 
dreams; these questions were asked rather to disguise the 
purpose of the study. 
4.3. Procedure
The study received ethical approval from the University of 
Bedfordshire prior to the collection of data. Participants 
were recruited from the University of Bedfordshire as well 
as from the internet. The study consisted of two open ended 
questions (dream recall/lucid dream frequency), two scales 
(Internal Locus of Control Scale and Openness to Experi-
ence Scale), an extended version of the Cognitive Reflection 
Test taken from Toplak, West and Stanovich (2014), and a 
Syllogisms Test; completed by every participant in this or-
der. Every questionnaire was on a different page. After the 
completion of the questionnaires, participants were directed 
to a page where they were shown the correct answers to 
the test questions, thanked for their time, debriefed, and 
given an email address in case they wanted to leave any 
comments regarding the study or withdrawn from the study. 
The dream diary was given after the completion of the on-
line questionnaire. Participants were instructed to fill in one 
table every morning for a month; this consisted of circling 
the number of dreams that they remembered and ticking the 
appropriate boxes for each of the dreams. The last page of 
the diary consisted of participants being thanked for their 
time and reminded to return the diary after one month.
5. Study 2 Results
The prospective measure of lucid dreams revealed that 7 
individuals (23.3%) reported no lucid dreams with the rest 
of the 23 participants reporting at least one lucid dream dur-
ing the month of the study. From the retrospective measure 
of lucid dreams, 6 (20%) reported no lucid dreams and 24 
reported at least one lucid dream (see Table 4). Descriptive 
statistics for the variables are displayed in Table 5. 
Spearman’s correlations were conducted to assess the 
relationship between Openness to Experience, Locus of 
Control, Dream Recall, CRT scores, Syllogisms test scores, 
and prospective and retrospective measures of LDF. Al-
pha level was reduced to .01 to account for the inflated 
Type 1 error when conducting multiple correlations. There 
was a very high significant positive correlation found be-
tween Internal Locus of Control and prospective/retro-
spective measures of LDF, r = .80, p < .001 r =.80, p < .001 
between high Openness to Experience and prospective/
retrospective LDF, r =.85, p < .001 / r =.80, p < .001. The 
correlation between high Dream Recall and prospective/
retrospective measures of LDF approached significance, 
r =.23, p = .02. No significant correlations were found be-
tween either CRT scores or syllogisms test scores and 
prospective/retrospective measures of LDF. A very high 
significant correlation was found between prospective and 
retrospective measures of lucid dream frequency, r =.91, 
p < .001.
Using prospective measures, then, relationships were 
found between LDF and openness, and LDF and locus of 
control. However, no relationship was found between LDF 
and CRT scores using either the retrospective or the pro-
spective measure of LDF; likewise, no relationship was 
found between LDF and syllogisms scores using either ret-
rospective or prospective method. Thus, the second study 
confirmed the findings of Study 1 in failing to support a dual 
processing hypothesis of lucid dreaming.
6. General Discussion
Overall, the findings of the present paper indicate that there 
are relationships between prospective and retrospective 
measures of lucid dream frequency (LDF) and openness to 
experience, locus of control, and dream recall frequency. 
However, the dual processing hypothesis of lucid dreaming 
was not supported: no relationship between LDF and Cog-
nitive Reflective Test scores, nor with scores on a syllogisms 
test, was found, neither with retrospective nor prospective 
estimates of LDF. In addition there was no relationship found 
between LDF and video game play. 
Table 4. Frequency of lucid dreams in prospective and retrospective measures 
Prospective measure
No. of participants 7 (23.3%) 3 (10%) 6 (20%) 6 (20%) 3 (10%) 3 (10%) 1 (3.3%) 1 (3.3%)
No. of lucid dreams reported 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 23
Retrospective measure
No. of participants 6 (20%) 6 (20%) 8 (26.7%) 5 (16.7%) 1 (3.3%) 3 (10%) 1 (3.3%)
No. of lucid dreams reported 0 1 2 3 4 5 20
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for Study 2 variables
Variable Mean (SD)
Prospective LDF 2.96 (4.17)
Retrospective LDF 2.53 (3.62)
Locus of Control 4.31 (1.09)
Openness to Experience 3.30 (0.71)
CRT scores 4.10 (2.02)
Syllogisms Test scores 5.56 (1.13)
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There was a very high correlation between prospective 
and retrospective measures of LDF; thus participants cor-
rectly estimated their frequency of lucid dreams in a month 
prior to having them recorded in a dream journal. Diary 
measures have been shown to correlate with scientifically 
verified lucid dreaming measured in the laboratory (Kueny, 
1985). Thus, when it comes to estimating the frequency of 
lucid dreams in questionnaires, participants can provide re-
liable data. In the first study, roughly 87% of the sample 
was classified as lucid dreamers, whereas in the second 
study, 80% were detected using prospective measures. By 
measuring their frequency using a retrospective approach, 
the sample from the second study had 76% lucid dream-
ers. This finding agrees with previous findings that student 
samples contained 82% lucid dreamers (Schredl & Erlacher, 
2004). However, the current study defined lucid dreaming in 
terms of awareness of the dream state and also the ability 
to control it; future research should investigate lucid dream 
frequency comparing frequency for awareness of the dream 
state alone, and frequency for awareness of the dream state 
and control. The data from both studies revealed that there 
was a relationship between locus of control and LDF, sug-
gesting that lucid dreamers have a more internal locus of 
control than non-lucid dreamers. This finding is in accor-
dance with previous studies assessing the relationship be-
tween locus of control and LDF (Blagrove & Hartnell, 2000; 
Blagrove & Tucker, 1994). Patrick and Durndell (2004) argue 
that internal locus of control positively correlates with wak-
ing life attempts to control the environment and control is 
central to maintaining a lucid dream; thus individuals with 
an internal locus of control would exhibit more control over 
the dream environment. 
LDF also correlated with openness to experience in both 
studies. This finding is in agreement with previous studies 
that have found significant correlations between the open-
ness to experience factor and LDF (Schredl & Erlacher, 2004; 
Watson, 2003). Correlations were unusually high in the sec-
ond study for LDF and locus of control and openness to 
experience. This may be due to the sample; the participants 
are likely to have had a special interest in dreams since they 
volunteered to do research that was unusually involved but 
without incentive, and many of whom were recruited from 
dream-related groups online. Therefore, the findings of the 
second study would benefit from replication with a more 
representative sample. In addition, the locus of control and 
openness scores were self-report measures, whereas the 
CRT and syllogisms relied on the participant getting the 
right answer; so the high correlations may perhaps reflect 
participants’ perception of a potential link between lucid 
dreaming and internal locus of control / openness, as these 
measures are vulnerable to expectation biases.
The analysis further revealed that there was a relation-
ship between dream recall and LDF; thus, individuals who 
have a higher rate of dream recall also have a higher rate of 
LDF. The correlation between the two measures had been 
previously reported in studies (Blackmore, 1982; Watson, 
2001; Schredl & Erlacher, 2004; Schredl & Erlacher, 2011). 
It makes sense that individuals who recall more dreams in 
general, also report more lucid dreams.
There was no relationship found between videogame play 
and lucid dream frequency. This finding did not support pre-
vious research. It may be that the scale used was not reli-
ably able to measure game playing; future research should 
implement other methods of measuring gameplay to further 
investigate this. 
There was no relationship found between both prospec-
tive and retrospective LDF and CRT scores, nor between 
prospective/retrospective LDF and syllogisms test scores. 
As these were employed as measures of reflective cognitive 
ability, it would be reasonable to conclude that there is no 
relationship between the frequency of dream accounts of 
reflective reasoning manifested in the form of lucid dreams 
and waking life reflective ability measured with the cognitive 
reflective test and with performance on syllogisms tests. 
However, it may be that different measures would provide 
us with different results; the tests employed in the present 
study might not measure the same type of reflective ability 
as that manifested in lucid dreams. Dream reflection does 
imply an awareness of the conditions within the dream, 
thus reflective awareness of the environment and oneself 
could be measured instead of reflective reasoning abilities. 
However, these prove to be hard to measure and require an 
in depth understanding of awareness as a feature of con-
sciousness, which is poorly understood. Furthermore, the 
correlation between CRT scores and Syllogism test scores 
in the present study was weak, which indicates that the two 
tests did not measure the same kind of thinking style. Fur-
ther research could implement other measures of reflective 
reasoning abilities or focus on measuring reflective aware-
ness of the environment and of oneself.
On the other hand, this was not the first study to fail 
to find a relationship between lucid dreaming and a task 
known to require dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activation. 
In Neider et al.’s (2010) study, participants who were more 
Table 6. Correlation Coefficients for all variables
rLDF Locus of 
Control
Openness to 
Experience
CRT scores Syllogisms 
scores
Dream 
Recall
pLDF .91** .80** .85** .18 .23 .16
rLDF --- .91** .80** .26 .24 .23
Locus of Control --- .75** .37 .17 .25
Openness to Experience --- .34 .17 .37
CRT scores --- .12 .47**
Syllogisms scores --- .06
* Correlation is significant at the p < .01 level.
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lucid in their dreams than others performed better at the 
Iowa Gambling Task, which is known to activate the ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex, but not at the Wisconsin Card 
Sort task, which is known to activate the dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex. In addition to this, the effect of transcranial 
direct current stimulation (tDCS) on the dorsolateral prefron-
tal cortex only enhanced lucidity in dreams in participants 
who already were experiencing lucid dreams frequently, but 
not in those who experienced lucid dreams infrequently or 
never (Stumbrys, Erlacher, & Schredl, 2013). These findings 
coupled with those of the present study query the degree 
of involvement of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in lucid 
dreaming. It is likely that lucid dream onset is more compli-
cated than a simple reactivation of the dorsolateral prefron-
tal cortex; as suggested by Mota-Rolim et al. (2010), it may 
be that different neural substrates are implicated in different 
kinds of lucid dreaming, since lucid dreaming is not a uni-
tary phenomenon. 
Although humans spend one third of their life sleeping, 
most models of human cognition are structured based upon 
evidence derived from waking-life cognition. The develop-
ment of a 24 hour model of cognition is necessary for the 
further understanding of consciousness. The existence of 
lucid dreaming reveals higher-order cognitive skills present 
during sleep; skills that previously have been assumed to 
be characteristic only of waking life. The question remains 
whether there is any relationship between the manifestation 
of higher-order cognitive skills in dreams and their manifes-
tation in waking life. The uniquely human ability to reflect 
upon ourselves, think about past and plan the future could 
help illuminate the human condition. 
6.1. Conclusion
There was no relationship found between rational reflective 
abilities measured with the Cognitive Reflective Test nor the 
syllogisms test and lucid dream frequency, whether mea-
sured retrospectively or prospectively, therefore providing 
no evidence for a dual-processing account of lucid dream-
ing. However, internal locus of control, dream recall fre-
quency, and openness to experience were correlated with 
lucid dream frequency, supporting previous research. Fur-
ther studies could implement other measures of reflective 
reasoning abilities or reflective awareness in order to assess 
if REM sleep accounts of reflection (i.e. lucid dreaming) cor-
relate with different waking life reflective abilities.
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